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SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP: AN ORGANIZING CONCEPT 
FOR INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS REFORM 
Lowell Turner 
School of Industrial and Labor Relations 
Cornell University 
In this era of globalization and intensified world market competition, once stable 
relationships involving firms, unions and government have come under pressure everywhere. 
Here in the United States, a crisis of economic competitiveness, industrial relations instability, 
and union decline has generated a new openness to reform efforts, including a widespread 
willingness to learn from the successful practices of both domestic innovators and foreign 
competitors. Employers, for example, have increasingly moved to adopt "lean" and high-quality-
oriented forms of organization as well as new participatory programs for employees. Unions 
have shown increasing interest in gening involved and providing input into the establishment and 
operation of such innovations. A new government wants to reform labor law to facilitate 
workplace change and labor-management cooperation. We still lack, however, broad concepts 
to inform a package of meaningful industrial relations and labor law reform. In this paper, I 
argue that social partnership, borrowed from the European Community, Germany, and numerous 
other societies, if adapted to particular American circumstances, is an ideal concept around which 
to organize and synthesize industrial relations reform in the United States. 
Social partnership is an organizing concept for a range of practices based on labor-
management negotiation and collaboration, for the good of the economy, firm and workforce. 
The essential contemporary relevance of this approach is that we are all in this together; in 
today's turbulent markets, managers and employees will sink or swim together. This is not, 
however, one vague, Utopian happy family. Firms, like societies, contain contrasting interests; 
these interests need to be organized and recognized so that realistic negotiation between social 
partners can succeed. In much of Europe, for example, managers and employer associations 
represent the firm; works councils and unions represent the workforce. For the U.S., application 
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of this concept requires labor law reform to encourage both official recognition of workforce 
representatives and social-partnership-style negotiations and outcomes. 
We do not need minor labor law reforms that nibble around the edges of our own system, 
in the name of accepting political realities or preserving our distinctive American system. This 
system no longer works well, because the world has changed. We need substantial reform based 
on new concepts that reflect new product and labor market realities: intensified world market 
competition and pervasive non-unionism in the United States. The social partnership conceptual 
framework can pull together substantial reform into a politically viable package. Social 
partnership makes possible labor law reform that will increase the morale, commitment and 
participation of American workers in their own workplaces, raise skill levels, productivity, and 
flexibility to increase the competitiveness of American firms in world markets, and contribute 
to a devitalization of the U.S. labor movement. 
Many have given up on the future of unions in the United States. For those of us who 
have not, it is clear that American industrial relations must change in two important ways. First, 
there must be major new organizing efforts that draw on the lessons of successful campaigns by 
unions such as the SEIU, supponed by legal reform that levels the playing field for union 
proponents (Friedman and Prosten 1993; Bronfenbrenner 1993). Second, American workers and 
unions must have increased capacity to participate in a proactive and constructive way in 
management decision-making processes (Marshall 1987; Cohen-Rosenthal and Burton 1987; 
Weiler 1990; Turner 1991). New organizing is necessary to revitalize the labor movement and 
reverse its long-term decline; increased worker participation is necessary to overcome the 
primarily adversarial relationship between labor and management that has launched American 
employers on a long-term, anti-union trajectory and that has denied workers and their unions full 
input into the many ways in which work is being reorganized. 
THE ELEMENTS OF SUCCESSFUL SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP 
There are four critical elements of social partnership. 
Mutual Recognition 
Mutual acceptance and recognition are based on the notion that there are contrasting 
although overlapping interests in the workplace that need to be identified for purposes of 
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discussion, negotiation, conflict resolution, and where possible, consensus building. No other 
advanced industrial society has the kind of bitterly adversarial campaigns for and against union 
recognition that we have in the U.S. While there are good historical reasons why we have done 
things this way, and while progressive New Deal legislation was necessary to make these battles 
as fair as possible, world market circumstances demand that we move on. Not only are such 
battles costly, they can and often do permanently damage the prospects for a constructive 
relationship between labor and management, no matter who wins the NLRB election. 
From large countries such as Japan and Germany to smaller countries such as Austria, 
Denmark and Belgium, societies with much higher rates of unionization than found in the U.S. 
have done well on world markets (in the above sample, union density ranges from the 20-30% 
level (Japan) to the 60-80% level (Austria and Denmark)).1 In these societies, unions arc not 
required to wage costly and adversarial campaigns for recognition, nor do employers put major 
effort into opposing union membership among their workforces. 
We need labor law reform that will not simply level the playing field for unions and 
managements (although that is important), but encourage mutual recognition and acceptance as 
well. Labor law should be reformed around the new concept: it is government policy to 
encourage relations of partnership between labor and management. Unions operating in this 
framework conceive of themselves both as organizations to advocate member interests and as 
proactive negotiating partners working for the interests of the company's market success. 
Employees should, therefore, be encouraged to join unions; certification elections should be 
greatly speeded up and facilitated, at best through 50% card check recognition. Employers are 
encouraged as a matter of public policy not to wage antagonistic and demoralizing campaigns 
against social-partnership unions. Penalties for unfair labor practices such as illegal firings of 
union activists should be greatly stiffened. 
The intent of this set of policies would be to spread social-partnership industrial relations 
and collective bargaining throughout the economy. A government elected with strong support 
from organized labor should be willing to go on record for labor law reform that encourages 
increasing union membership density, within a social partnership framework. 
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Participation 
The new wisdom in the U.S. is that employees and their representatives have much to 
offer in a proactive way to company practices, from strategic decisions to shopfloor practices. 
We hear calls for enhanced participation, employee input, commitment from corporate and union 
headquarters, and, now, interest and concern on the part of the highest offices of government. 
At . ?ss conferences, large and small, we have heard testimonials about successful cases of 
participation: Saturn, NUMMI, Xerox, AT&T, and many others. We know now that participation 
can work, and that participatory relationships between employees and their employers, and 
between unions and management, are particularly suited to the requirements of flexibility, 
innovation and quality in today's demanding market circumstances (Eaton and Voos 1992; 
Marshall 1992; Belzer 1993). 
But participation will remain ad hoc, dependent on personal relationships, or confined to 
particular innovative firms, unless it is anchored in society-wide institutions. When power-
sharing is involved, internal barriers to innovation are often insurmountable, even if the idea 
makes supreme market sense. When such innovation fails (as it all too often does), this can be 
viewed as a case of market failure that requires a corrective, external push. Employees in the 
United States and elsewhere, therefore, need formal rights and structures to guarantee their 
integration in company decision-making, which in turn can have a salutary effect on the smooth 
implementation of new company policies to reorganize and restructure (Weiler 1990; Adams 
1992). 
Works councils are the critical vehicle for employee participation in firm decision-making 
in Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and elsewhere. We need an 
American version based on new legislation requiring Employee Participation Councils (EPCs) 
in workplaces of more than 50 employees, elected by the entire workforce, hourly and salaried, 
in union and non-union workplaces alike, to guarantee employee information, consultation, and 
participation rights. 
This is a new idea for the United States, but an idea whose time is approaching. There 
has been a recent flurry of interest in such proposals from labor scholars such as Weiler (1990), 
Kochan (1992), and Freeman and Rogers (1993). This may not be an idea that will win 
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widespread acceptance right away in either business or labor circles — there is understandable 
resistance to such far-reaching reform — but the conversation needs to begin. 
If well designed and legally supported, EPCs would bring a new measure of regularized 
participation into American workplaces at low cost and low risk. Consider the advantages for 
the various parties. For companies, costly and often inconclusive internal management debates 
concerning where to start in changing decades-old adversarial relations and habits (on the part 
of both managers and workers) could be partially resolved. There would be a common starting 
point in every firm: an EPC empowered to share information with management, to discuss and 
negotiate the terms of internal reforms in work organization and personnel policy, and to help 
smooth the implementation of innovation. High-level executives, who often favor new relations 
of cooperation, trust, and participation, but see well-meaning programs undone at middle levels 
of the organization, would have a mandated structure to insist upon and monitor. Middle 
managers, who fear displacement of authority in cooperative programs such as Employee 
Involvement and Total Quality Management, would have a protected and clearly designated 
partner for discussion and negotiation, as well an important ally for implementation efforts. 
While EPC costs would be paid for by the firm, these costs would be low in relation to 
the potential gain. Firms incur substantial expense in order to communicate programs and policy 
changes to the workforce, respond to negative reactions and effects, scrap failed programs, and 
develop yet another round of new programs and policies. The regularization of such information 
channels and considered approval of innovation through the EPC would go a long way toward 
justifying the cost of regular council meetings. Since changes in business strategy, personnel and 
human resource policy, and production organization would all benefit at the outset from blue-
and white-collar employee input through the council, smooth innovation could make the small 
investment in EPC costs a big winner for firms that approach the new institution in a positive 
and proactive way. 
For employees, EPCs would bring to the workplace a regularized mechanism for 
participation by means of elected representatives. Unlike many management participation 
schemes that appear to come from on high and are widely distrusted (and half-heartedly 
implemented if not ignored or sabotaged), the position of the EPC would have legitimacy. If 
their constituents so desired, councillors could help design and implement broader participatory 
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processes to include all employees. In nonunion workplaces, employees would have new 
structures of representation to ensure that their voices are heard, their needs considered, and their 
potential contribution to company decision making not overlooked. In union workplaces, 
employees would have an additional structure of representation beyond collective bargaining to 
make their voices heard in traditional areas of "managerial prerogative" that have a direct bearing 
on the quality of their working lives. 
For unions, EPCs would offer little or no threat, and they might provide considerable 
opportunity. As in most other countries that have works councils of one kind or another, EPCs 
would be expressly enjoined from activities in the traditional union domain such as collective 
bargaining for wages.2 In union workplaces, local unions could run slates of candidates for EPC 
positions to achieve for the workforce and union an added measure of constructive voice in 
personnel and work organization decisions. The experience from countries with strong and weak 
works councils alike is that union members typically do very well in council elections.3 EPCs 
can serve to integrate local unions into company decision-making, in relations of social 
partnership, to revitalize the capacity of local unions to provide an independent voice for the 
workforce. 
The evidence from Europe is that works councils on the whole, far from undermining 
union influence, have bolstered the union position within the workplace, firm, and society (for 
Germany, see Streeck 1984; Thelen 1991; and Turner 1991; for other countries, see Ferner and 
Hyman 1992).4 It is for this reason that labor movements once opposed to works councils 
(viewed as class collaborationist and undermining union influence) have become strong 
proponents, as in Italy, Britain, and Ireland. The European Trade Union Confederation is actively 
promoting the spread of cross-national Euro-works councils at firms throughout the European 
Community (Turner 1993). In Great Britain, the last European labor holdout against works 
councils, union research centers are studying the possible application of works councils to British 
industrial relations even as the Trades Union Congress has taken a position in favor of Euro-
works councils at European multinational companies.5 
At noh-union workplaces, it is unlikely that EPCs would serve as a major new barrier 
against union effons to organize. In any case, unions are making few inroads into unorganized 
territory at the present time. By offering their services and advice to the councils (on questions 
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such as work organization, personnel policy, and participation programs), unions could find their 
prospects enhanced. As union organizing drives take on a social partnership dimension, pro-
union employees could make the legitimate claim that unionization would bolster the 
independence and proactive capacities of the established EPC. 
As much as possible, council efforts should be concentrated at the plant level to ensure 
meaningful and direct participation. Yet, participation at the firm level is obviously important 
as well so that employees become involved in the company's strategic decision making. For 
firms with 50 or more employees scattered among small workplaces, there should be a cross-plant 
EPC. For fiims with multiple workplaces each consisting of 50 or more employees, there should 
be councils at each plant as well as one general council (composed of delegates from the plant 
councils) to ensure employee participation in the firm's long-range planning. 
Works council rules and structures vary so much from one country to the next that this 
new institution need not be viewed as a foreign import. Rather the EPC can accurately be 
conceived of as a consolidation and systematization of the recent waves of participatory 
innovation in American workplaces, union and non-union alike (Eaton and Voos 1992; Kochan, 
Katz and McKersie 1993). 
Vocational Training 
It has become a matter of conventional wisdom that we need to raise skill levels 
throughout our working population, and that this is now an important matter of public policy 
(Reich 1991). Yet once again we face the danger of ad hoc and piecemeal reform in the face 
of market failure to provide the necessary incentives and protections for widespread, nationwide 
vocational training. Rather, we need comprehensive vocational training reform based on 
generalized incentives and facilitating structures — just as we do for labor relations reform. In 
fact, the two are closely related and should be conceived of together as part of the new package 
of social partnership relations. Such linkages have worked well in other countries, just as they 
have worked well in the past in American industries such as construction. 
Germany is often cited as a society that has mobilized high skills in its working 
population. It is widely recognized that German industrial success over the past thirty years is 
based upon an extensive system of vocational training in which up to two-thirds of young 
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Germans complete three-year apprenticeships in a wide variety of service, technical, and 
industrial occupations. Critical to the success of this system in Germany is the active 
participation and leadership of employers and employer associations as well as unions and works 
councils, thereby helping to ensure that skills training reflects die most advanced needs of the 
shopfloor and office (Lynch 1993; Berg 1994a and 1994b). Costs are widely shared as employer 
association and government-sponsored incentives encourage the participation in this massive 
training effort of virtually all large and medium-sized firms, and many small firms as well. 
Unions and works councils facilitate implementation by proactive participation in training 
programs and by demanding a steady stream of new apprentice hiring. Firms use their 
apprenticeship programs to develop and keep the best available potential talent.6 
Because of die condition of contemporary world markets, the United States needs a 
nationwide system of vocational training, with the joint participation of industry, labor and 
government at national and local levels, to ensure that training is linked to innovative work 
organization.7 Labor law should be reformed to encourage broad training and retraining as a 
fundamental and universal element of industrial relations. Joint and regularized participation in 
widespread training efforts is one central task upon which the social partners can cooperate. If 
the economy of the United States needs to move toward both labor-management partnership and 
a more highly skilled workforce, it makes sense to link the two developments closely in a 
mutually reinforcing framework of reformed labor law. 
Institutional Infrastructure 
Most important, perhaps, is the recognition that all of these concepts and the 
implementing policies associated with them need to be integrated into an interlocking institutional 
infrastructure. These approaches work because they are closely related to each other. If we 
decide, for example, to increase federal funding and incentives for vocational education, this is 
unlikely to improve the competitiveness of American companies unless employers and unions are 
directly involved in setting up training programs and unless such training is linked to shopfloor 
innovations in work organization. To modernize industrial relations in the United States, we need 
not just new skills training, EPCs, a level playing field for unions, or an ideology of social 
90 
partnership; we need all of these things, as parts of a broad, mutually reinforcing policy package 
that can be implement successfully. 
Past economic and social policy reform efforts in the United States have often fallen far 
short of expectations. One major reason for such failings has been the tendency in our relatively 
decentralized political economy to consider specific policies separately rather than to recognize 
close interrelationships and linkages (Wilensky and Turner 1987). We need reforms that will 
build panicipation, cooperation, flexibility, high skills, and representation into a virtuous circle 
of mutually reinforcing success. Social partnership is the critical concept that can provide the 
framework to pull these various elements of success together. 
HOMEGROWN SUCCESS 
We do not need Japanese lean production, German works councils, or French wine. We 
make fine wine in California, although many of the grapes originally came from Europe — and 
our superb domestic production does not prevent us from also appreciating French wines. Just 
so, we can appreciate what the Japanese and Germans have accomplished — we can learn the 
appropriate lessons (just as they have each learned so many lessons from us) and we can enjoy 
superior products produced in these and other foreign countries. But at the same time, we can 
produce our own modernized industrial relations, new production organization, and widespread 
skills training. There is nothing foreign about notions of partnership between industry, labor, and 
government. We have distinct American traditions upon which to build, from the long-term 
efforts of the National Planning Association to the dramatically successful War Labor Board to 
more recent innovations at Saturn, Xerox and AT&T. 
Social partnership is an idea whose time has come in world markets that demand 
continual innovation. In constructing the partnership, we have our own homegrown and 
successful traditions upon which to build: risk-taking American entrepreneurs unafraid of 
innovation and reform; large and medium-sized corporations skilled in internal organization, 
negotiation, and power-sharing; assertive employees versed in political democracy external to the 
firm and anxious for enhanced voice and panicipation within the firm; a "laboratory" of 
successful and unsuccessful participatory experiments in union and non-union settings; assertive 
and democratic unions experienced in representing the best interests of employees and, at the 
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same time, ready to compromise; and, an adversarial tradition that paradoxically produces 
assertive parties capable of meaningful partnership under new and challenging circumstances. 
Participatory partnerships of one kind or another have proven themselves in countries 
around the globe, from Australia to Japan to North America to Europe. Such efforts arguably 
have the broadest success where they are underpinned by institutional incentives and structures. 
We have the inspiration and the path-breaking examples but not yet the necessary society-wide 
policy and institutional support. 
Before we start tinkering with the specifics of labor law reform, we need a new 
conceptual framework that will provide direction for future participatory efforts. Social 
partnership — or perhaps to give it a distinctly American flavor we should call it "strategic 
partnership" — can provide that framework. Once we have broad agreement on the framework, 
we can move quickly to specify and negotiate the details of policy reform - reformed procedures 
for union recognition, new structures of participation, system-wide skills training — that can 
combine in a workable and politically viable package of labor law reform. 
ENDNOTES 
1. For Japan, see Freeman (1989, p.130); for Austria, see Traxler (1992, p.285); for 
Denmark, see Scheuer (1992, p.177). 
2. Germany affords a useful example of how this "dual system" of representation works and 
has proven compatible with both strong economic performance and influential unions. See 
Streeck 1984, Thelen 1991, and Turner 1991, 95-117. 
3. In works council elections in Germany in 1990, 75% of elected councillors were union 
members (Niedenhoff 1990, 11-12). In 1989 works committee elections in France, where the 
committees are much weaker than in Germany, 74% of elected committee members belonged 
to unions (although divided among a number of contending union federations; European 
Industrial Relations Review 200 [September 1990], 6]). 
4. Femer and Hyman (1992, xxiv), on the basis of 17 country case studies, make the 
persuasive argument that union resilience in the contemporary period has much to do with the 
integration of workplace structures of representation and national unions. For example, such 
integration has characterized Austria and Germany, where unions have stayed strong, but not 
Britain and France, where union influence has declined seriously. 
5. It is no coincidence that in Britain, with no works councils, union influence in the 
workplace and society has declined seriously in the past decade (Turner 1991, 200-205; 
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Edwards et al. 1992). See the revealing recent article by John Edmonds (1994), one of 
Britain's top labor leaders, who wounds the call for a British version of works councils. 
6. See also Abraham and Houseman (1993) and Stephen Kinzer, "Germans' Apprentice 
System Is Seen as Key to Long Boom," New York Times. Feb. 6, 1983, pp. 1,5. 
7. See, for example, "AFL-CIO Guidelines on SkiU Training and School-to-Work Transition 
in the 1990s and Beyond," in "Statements Adopted by the AFL-CIO Executive Council," 
Washington DC, May 4, 1993, pp. 3-7. 
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